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Abstract
The Chor-Rivest cryptosystem is a public key cryptosystem first proposed by MIT
cryptographers Ben Zion Chor and Ronald Rivest [Chor84]. More recently Chor has imple
mented the cryptosystem as part of his doctoral thesis [Chor85]. Derived from the knapsack
problem, this cryptosystem differs from earlier knapsack public key systems in that computa
tions to create the knapsack are done over finite algebraic fields. An interesting result of
Bose and Chowla supplies a method of constructing higher densities than previously attain
able [Bose62]. Not only does an increased information rate arise, but the new system so far is
immune to the low density attacks levied against its predecessors, notably those of Lagarias-
Odlyzko and Radziszowski-Kreher [Laga85, Radz86].
An implementation of this cryptosystem is really an instance of the general scheme, dis
tinguished by fixing a pair of parameters, p and h , at the outset. These parameters then
remain constant throughout the life of the implementation (which supports a community of
users). Chor has implemented one such instance of his cryptosystem, where p =197 and
h =24. This thesis aspires to extend Chor's work by admitting p and h as variable inputs at
run time. In so doing, a cryptanalyst is afforded the means to mimic the action of arbitrary
implementations.
A high degree of success has been achieved with respect to this goal. There are only a
few restrictions on the choice of parameters that may be selected. Unfortunately this general
ity incurs a high cost in efficiency; up to thirty hours of (VAX1 1-780) processor time are
needed to generate a single key pair in the desired range (p = 243 and h =18).
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction and Background
1. Overview
A Public Key Cryptosystem is implemented in software to run on the UNIXf
operating system. Fundamentally a cryptosystem should provide users a means to
exchange secret information such that eavesdroppers cannot understand the communica
tion. A public key cryptosystem provides this service with an added bonus: The
correspondents do not exchange any secret information, or keys, before establishing
(encrypted) communication. Rather, the sender consults a directory of all participants in
the system and obtains the information (the public key) associated with the desired reci
pient. This information is passed to a system provided facility (the enciphering facility)
along with the message to be disguised. The resultant message is unintelligible, except to
the intended recipient. With other information (his private key) and the garbled message,
the receiver may call a second system provided facility (the deciphering facility) to
recover the original message. While it is not necessary for the users to have had previous
contact, it prerequisite that the keys be precomputed for each participant (in the key
generation facility).
The particular cryptosystem implemented was proposed by Ben-Zion Chor and
Ronald Rivest in 1984 [Chor84]. In this scheme, encryption and decryption are based
on the knapsack problem from complexity theory (see 1.2.3). Thus we shall refer to
this scheme as the Chor-Rivest Knapsack Type Public Key Cryptosystem, or the Chor-
fUNIX is a trademark of Bell Laboratories.
Rivest system for short.
As a public key cryptosystem our Chor-Rivest system implementation naturally
provides the above facilities. However, our goal was not to develop a secure public key
system. Instead we provide a tool for cryptanalysts who wish to break the system. More
specifically, there has been research at Rochester Institute of Technology which may be
applied to breaking knapsack based cryptosystems [Radz86]. The Chor-Rivest system
has not yet been broken but there is some confidence that this research may be extended
to include this scheme. This implementation will provide the data necessary for this
task.
Because we provide a system for experimentation with different cryptanalytic
attacks, flexibility is required of the system. In particular, the Chor-Rivest scheme is
based on arithmetic in finite fields. Typically, a given implementation would fix certain
parameters defining the specific field used by all of the system facilities. This greatly
simplifies the implementation without compromising the integrity of the system. Here,
these same parameters are variables, which the cryptanalyst may alter to try his attack on
arbitrary Chor-Rivest implementations. Furthermore, the system facilities allow easy
disclosure or modification of important intermediate results. Alternatively, maintenance
of the directory of users and protocols for message passing are not a concern of this pro
ject. Hence, although we provide all functions as prescribed this is not a ready to install
user oriented system [Chor84].
2. Previous Work
2.1. General Background
In this thesis we are primarily interested in public key cryptology. However an
overview of the techniques and terminology of classical (or conventional) cryptology is
prerequisite to the ensuing discussion. The field of cryptology embraces the disciplines
of cryptography and cryptanalysis . Cryptography is the designing of cipher systems,
while cryptanalysis is concerned with breaking ciphers. Intuitively, a cipher is a means
of disguising a message such that (hopefully) only the intended recipient can recover its
meaning.
Cryptology has been practiced throughout much of history. Julius Caesar (100-44
B.C.) and Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) are notable examples of prominent cryptogra
phers [Beke82]. Thus cryptology is a very old science, but it was not until the 1940's
that it was formalized.
Shannon defines a cipher system (also called a cryptosystem) as a three-tuple:
These are the set of messages, the set of cryptograms (or ciphertext messages), and a set
of invertible transformations [Shan49]. The sender disguises a message, called the plain
text, by applying one of the transformations to the message to yield the ciphertext. The
recipient of the message performs the inverse of the transformation to recover the origi
nal message. These operations are called encryption and decryption respectively. A key
is associated with each element of the set of transformations, thus the sender and
receiver must agree upon a key prior to exchanging messages.
The cryptanalyst attempts to break the system. That is, given only publicly avail
able information and a portion of ciphertext, the cryptanalyst hopes to find a way to
deduce the plaintext or better yet, the key used. To attain this goal, the cryptanalyst will
often begin by trying to break the system given much or all of the secret information.
He then proceeds by polishing his technique to require progressively less privileged
information, ultimately rendering the system useless. Using this tact a partially success
ful attack often results. Perhaps an attack that works only for a subset of the message
space or when certain additional secret information is compromised.
It is always assumed that the cryptanalyst knows the entire cipher system, includ
ing the set of transformations, but not the particular key used. We may then categorize
cryptanalysis into three levels of attack upon the system [Diff76]. The weakest attack
occurs when the interceptor has only encrypted messages to work with. This is a cipher-
text only attack. A stronger attack, the known plaintext attack, occurs when the intercep
tor has at least one encrypted message along with its plaintext translation. Finally, the
chosen plaintext attack is the strongest attack to which a cipher system may be subjected.
Here, the cryptanalyst has the means to encrypt messages of his own choosing.
Now we can assess the security of a given cryptosystem. This is a measure of its
resilience to the various levels of cryptanalytic attacks. A cipher system is called uncon
ditionally secure if it can withstand cryptanalysis with unlimited computation. A system
called the one-time pad is the only unconditionally secure cipher system in common use.
Unconditional security results only if several meaningful solutions exist for a given
cipher [Diff76]. In general it is necessary to use inordinately long keys (as in the one
time pad) or extremely complicated algorithms to attain unconditional security. These
approaches are undesirable due to the increased cost or time requirements. Therefore,
for practical (economic) reasons we are interested rather in systems that are computation
ally secure. Here the system is considered secure if the computational cost of cryp
tanalysis is prohibitive, even though the system might not resist an unbounded attack.
Secure, throughout the remainder of this paper, will mean "computationally secure". We
may further classify the security of a system relative to the levels of attack to which it
will succumb. So while a system may be secure under a ciphertext only attack, it may be
considerably less secure under a chosen plaintext attack.
There are other factors of import in the evaluation of cipher systems in addition to
security. Perhaps the most important of these is the information rate R provided by a
particular system [Chor84, Simm79]:
R = \og2\M\/N
where M is the message space and N is the number of bits in the ciphertext. Thus the
information rate is an efficiency concern: If a system is secure, but encrypted messages
are many times longer than the original message, one may want to choose a slightly less
secure system having a higher information rate. For instance, the one-time pad men
tioned above, requires a key as long as all of the messages to ever be encrypted. Clearly
this is impractical in most applications!
2.2. Public Key Cryptosystems
In 1976 Diffie and Hellman sparked a revolution in cryptology with their idea for
public key encryption [Diff76]. The outstanding feature of this class of cipher systems is
that the communicants do not exchange keys prior to exchanging messages. Instead, a
key is associated with each user in a public directory. In this section we outline how
this is accomplished.
Recall that in conventional cipher systems, the sender and receiver must agree
upon then hold in secret the key. This is necessary because the encryption and decryp
tion functions are closely related to each other. Such a scheme is termed symmetric if it
is easy to deduce the enciphering transformation knowing the deciphering transforma
tion and vice versa [Simm79].
If on the other hand it is difficult1 to deduce the decryption function knowing the
encryption function an asymmetric scheme results. In asymmetric schemes there are two
keys, one associated with encryption and the other associated with decryption. Since it
is not feasible to compute one key from the other, there is no loss in security if one of
the keys is revealed. Thus a public key system is an asymmetric scheme in which an
encryption/decryption key pair is found for each participant's enciphering (public) key
is posted in a public directory along with his name, but his deciphering (private) key is
'By difficult we mean computationally infeasible, given modern equipment and technology.
held in secret. To send messages one simply obtains the recipient's public key then
encrypts the message using it. The recipient deciphers the message using his private key.
To construct a public key system one needs a way to find matched key pairs satis
fying the above constraint. This is done by choosing a computationally difficult problem
from complexity theory as the basis of the system. We will digress briefly to introduce
some terms from this field which will be useful to us.
Complexity Theory is a collection of results that attempts to explain what we mean
when we say "problem A is harder than problem B".2 A problem is a general question
which may be described by specificing its input parameters and stating the properties
required of the solution. If we are given all of the input parameters then we have an
instance of the general problem. An algorithm is a detailed procedure for solving a prob
lem; For our purposes, algorithms are equivalent to computer programs. The approach
taken is to determine the complexity of individual problems, then problems with similar
complexity are placed into one of the several equivalence classes constituting the com
plexity hierarchy.
We now describe the criteria for membership in the predominant equivalence
classes. Say / is some function and a is an algorithm that computes / (i.e. a(x ) com
putes / (x ) on input x ). We count the number of "primitive
instructions"
required by a
to compute f(x). This value is called the running time RT(a,x). Now the complexity
Ta(n ) of a on input of size n is:
TJji ) = max{RT(a, x ) : size of x is n }.
If there is a polynomial p (n ) such that Ta(n ) < p (n ) for all n , we say that a computes /
in polynomial time and write:
2No attempt is made to be rigorous in this discourse; only an intuitive understanding is necessary. The
following results largely follow Garey and Johnson [Gare79].
Ta(n) = 0(p(n)).
The set P = {all deterministic polynomial time problems} is the resulting equivalence
class of problems. If on the other hand TJji) = <9(2lpMI) for some polynomial p(n)
then a is called an exponential time algorithm and is a member of EXP = {all exponential
time problems). EXP encompasses more difficult problems than P. Also included in
EXP is the class NP = {all nondeterministic polynomial time problems}. More precisely, P
CJVPC Exp, and P c Exp?
Finally, the set of NP problems has a subset called the NP -complete problems
which are in some sense the hardest problems in NP. If it is possible to adapt an algo
rithm that solves problem B to obtain one that solves problem A then there is a function
r.A>B. Furthermore, if t is computable in polynomial time then r is said to be a
polynomial-time transformation from A to B. A problem A is called NP -complete if and
only if
1) A e NP,
2) for every B e NP, there is a polynomial-time transformation from B to A.
It is members of this class of problems that have been suggested for use as the basis of
public key cryptosystems4 [Diff76].
Notice that the classification of problems presented above describes the worst case
complexity of a given problem. Consider a problem X which is a member of NP. In
general, with sufficiently large input we could not expect to solve X on any known com
puting machine. But since we have a nondeterministic algorithm to solve X, there may
be several instances of X which can be solved on a computer, even for very large input.
This observation is crucial to our application, providing a means to construct matched
^There are also an infinite number of complexity levels above EXP in the complexity hierarchy:
However we are able to exhibit only somewhat artificial problems as witnesses to this hierarchy [Lewi8l].
4Wagner has also proposed the use of undecidable problems from the theory of computability, but this
idea has not yet been generally accepted [Wagn84] .
public/private key pairs.
The following terms were defined by Diffie and Hellman to augment complexity
theory for applications to public key cryptography [Diff76]. We say that a function / is
easy to compute if there is a known algorithm a in the complexity class P which com
putes /. Otherwise, / is hard to compute. If a bijection b is easy to compute and b~x is
hard to compute, then b is said to be a one way function. Finally, a function t is a trap
door function if
(1) /is easy to compute;
(2) there exists some side information (the key) without which / is a one way
function, but given the key t~x is easy to compute.
To generate key pairs then we select a problem in NP (preferably in NP -complete)
believed to be not in P as the basis of the system. An instance of this problem is con
strued that may be deterministicly solved with information about the design. This ver
sion of the problem becomes the private key. This instance of the problem is then dis
guised to appear to be the general problem, hence the public key. In other words a trap
door function is constructed based on the chosen problem. Thus the technique used to
embed a trapdoor in a given problem defines a public key scheme.
To break the system, the cryptanalyst has two options. One option is to try to con
vert the public key back to the private key. To resist this attack, the cryptographer must
insure that the only way to do this is by exhaustive search over a prohibitively large set
of transformations. His only other option is to directly solve the general NP -complete
problem given by the public key. Notice that by their very nature, public key systems
will be subject to chosen plaintext attack.
Shortly after Diffie and Hellman introduced the public key idea two schemes were
proposed. One was the Merkle-Hellman system based on the knapsack problem
[Merk78]. The other, set forth by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (called the RSA method)
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is based on the difficulty of factoring very large numbers [Rive78]. The RSA method is
generally believed to be the best public key technique in existence, and has the honor of
being the first one implemented in an LSI chip [Bric83]. The history of knapsack based
schemes is much more complicated as several early models have been broken leading to
subsequent improvements. We shall examine these developments in the next section, cul
minating with the Chor-Rivest knapsack scheme.
2.3. The Knapsack Problem in Cryptography
The knapsack problem is a very well known NP -complete problem from complexity
theory. Given a knapsack with fixed capacity and several items of various weights, the
knapsack problem is to determine how to completely fill the knapsack (if possible). For
our purposes, we are actually concerned with the closely related subset sum problem
[Gare79, Radz86]:
The Subset Sum Problem
Given a vector of positive integers a* = {aia2, ,an) and a positive integer M
find, if it exists, a (0,l)-vector
x*
= (x1?x2, ,xn) such that
n
2 a,- Xi = M.
1=1
To adapt this problem to cryptology we pick an
a*
such that the subset sum problem can
be solved easily for different M's, then we scramble the system giving
F = (b1,b2, ,bn). An easy way to do this is by performing a modular multiplication
of
a*
by some integer, v , which is relatively prime with respect to the modulus, m :
b = a*-v (mod m).
The resultant random-looking vector, F, is published as the public key while a*, m and v
comprise the private key [Merk78]. This process is called the key generation phase. To
encrypt a message, P, we merely take its binary representation to be a vector
f = (Pi,P2, " - " >/>)> tnen perform the computation:
C = Eft*.-,
=i
where C is the ciphertext to be sent. Note that if the message length \~p | exceeds the
length of F, we merely break the message into blocks of length n .
Decryption is only slightly more complicated. Because v and m are relatively
prime, there exists v_1 modulo m such that vv_1 = 1 (mod m). Thus we can find
N = C -v_1, then solve the easy knapsack:
N = Y,Pi-ai,
=i
to recover the binary message f.
The collection of the key generation, encryption, and decryption algorithms
together define the system. In the description above, we have avoided the topic of how
to create a*. The method chosen identifies the type of knapsack system we are using.
For instance, the Merkle-Hellman system requires that a* be a superincreasing sequence,
that is
t-i
a,- > J] ai fr ' = 2, 3, , n.
3=1
This was the first and simplest knapsack system proposed. A solution is found by suc
cessive subtractions.
An important measure of a knapsack system is its density:
Knapsack Density
The density d (a*) of a knapsack
a*
= (au a2, , an ) is d (a*) = n / log2 (max at ).
This property represents the information rate of the system [Chor84, Laga85, Radz86].
For instance, consider the knapsack vectors T = (19, 14, 31, 15,26) and
5*
= (45 9, 16, 32, 64). Both T and t have an average weight of 25, but each of the weights
in T can be represented in six bits whereas seven bits are required to represent the ele
ments of 5*. This relationship is reflected in the densities, d (T) = > d (?) = . There is
o /
10
also a relationship between the density of a knapsack and its security that will become
apparent in later sections. In this context we will speak in terms of high and low density
knapsacks where the cutoff is roughly 1.0. For now however, notice that superincreasing
knapsacks like T are generally low density since an must be large relative to n .
2.4. Recent Developments in Knapsack Cryptology
Having described the important properties of public key cryptosystems in general
and knapsack systems in specific, we now review their historical development. Essen
tially, each time a knapsack system has been proposed, its cryptanalysis has prompted
advances in solving the subset sum problem, which in turn has caused cryptographic
improvements in knapsack design! The current state of affairs finds the ball in the court
of the cryptanalysts due to the appearance of the Chor-Rivest system.
The Merkle-Hellman knapsack (described above) was developed at Stanford in
1978 as a direct result ofMerkle's doctoral work [Merk78, Merk82]. Since this introduc
tion, the security of trapdoor knapsacks have been regarded with suspicion by the cryp
tographic community [Bric83]. Indeed, in 1978 Adi Shamir (one of the inventors of the
RSA scheme) and Zipple showed that if the modulus m were known the system could
certainly be broken [Bric83]. Thus although our example showed only one modular mul
tiplication in the key generation phase, it was realized that the system could be
strengthened by iterating this process several times with a different v and m at each
iteration. In 1982 Shamir found a polynomial time algorithm to completely brake the
single-iteration method [Sham82b]. Brickell soon discovered a technique to break the
multiple-iteration technique [Bric83].
Shamir, working at the Weizmann Institute in Israel, used the knowledge that the
trapdoor was a superincreasing sequence in his attack. It turns out that the superin
creasing nature of the trapdoor imposes too much structure on the system. The
wor-
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khorse in this attack is the Lovasz algorithm in which basis reduction is performed on a
lattice [Lens83]. The goal of this operation is to find the basis with the shortest basis
vectors. For low-density knapsacks, the shortest vector found by the algorithm contains
the solution to the subset sum problem.
Coincidently with the cryptanalysis of the Merkle-Hellman scheme, Shamir pub
lished an improved knapsack system [Sham82a]. In the new scheme the trapdoor knap
sack need not be superincreasing, so the weights can be closer together, yielding a higher
density. Without going into details, the keys are formed via modular multiplication of
easy (but not necessarily superincreasing) knapsacks. The Merkle-Hellman knapsacks
form a subset of these newer knapsacks, thus an attack on this improved system would
apply to its predecessors.
Such attacks appeared very shortly as expected. Unfortunately, the Lovasz algo
rithm is not guaranteed to find the shortest vector in the lattice. This does not appear to
be a problem in the attack on the Merkle-Hellman system due to its very low density.
Adleman (again of RSA fame) noted that if the basis reduction algorithm came closer to
finding the shortest vector in the lattice it could be used to break the new Shamir system
[Adle83]. Also in 1982, the so called L3 Algorithm, an improvement on the Lovasz
method above, was introduced [Lens82]. This algorithm improves upon its predecessor
in that it is slightly faster and many low density (density < 0.6) knapsacks could be
solved with it, including the Shamir scheme.
At this point one might assume that knapsack systems were doomed. This was not
the case for several reasons. As of 1982, the L3 algorithm had not been applied to the
subset sum problem; This happened only recently when Lagarias and Odlyzko used it in
an algorithm to solve all sufficiently low density problems [Laga85]. Another, perhaps
more important, reason for not dismissing knapsack based cryptosystems has to do with
our definition of security. Recall that for a public key system to work it must be
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infeasible to break the system. The aforementioned attacks have polynomial time com
plexity, thus a sufficiently large knapsack (i.e. several hundred weights) is not feasibly
broken [Bric83]. The final and most important reason that knapsacks have not been
dismissed is (you guessed it!), a system has been devised to deliberately foil these low
density attacks with high density knapsacks. This is the Chor-Rivest scheme [Chor84].
Before proceeding to this latest knapsack system we must explore a very recent develop
ment in solving the subset sum problem.
Radziszowski and Kreher, based at Rochester Institute of Technology, proposed
an algorithm superior to L3 [Radz86]. Although the core of their algorithm is again the
lattice basis reduction technique of L3, several enhancements are added. Because they
avoid many of the multiprecision operations of the former method, their algorithm runs
an order of magnitude faster. Another major improvement in this algorithm is a tech
nique the authors call weight reduction which causes shorter vectors to be found in the
basis reduction operation. Due to these improvements, this algorithm can solve knap
sacks of density less than 1.0 while Z,3 works reliably for knapsacks with density less
than 0.6. It is noteworthy that neither algorithm makes any assumption about how the
knapsack was constructed.
At the present time, the Chor-Rivest scheme appears to be secure against this algo
rithm, producing knapsacks with density exceeding 1.0. However, Radziszowski and
Kreher report that further gains are to be had from their algorithm, hopefully to the
point of successful attack on the Chor-Rivest scheme [Radz86a]. This thesis is a sophis
ticated implementation of the Chor-Rivest scheme expressly designed to aid these cryp-
tanalysts. Prior to the current project, the only implementation of Chor-Rivest, was a
limited version produced by Chor himself as part of his doctoral thesis [Chor85]. His
implementation produces knapsacks of 197 elements, with a message space of binary
vectors having weight 24. The general scheme is not limited to these parameters, there
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are many suitable possibilities. The current implementation works for nearly all of the
suggested parameters, not only 197 and 24. The remainder of this chapter provides the
mathematical background needed to understand this most recent knapsack cryptosystem.
3. Theoretical and Conceptual Development
A result from Bose and Chowla is the cornerstone of the Chor-Rivest cryptosys
tem, providing the means to construct dense knapsacks [Bose62]. However this con
struction takes place in finite algebraic structures called Galois fields. In this section we
first orient the reader to Galois fields, then we examine how to represent and manipulate
them. Finally, the Bose-Chowla theorem is proved. The cryptographic usefulness of this
theorem will become apparent in chapter 2 where we show in detail how Chor and
Rivest exploit it. We provide a running example of these concepts as they apply to the
current problem (summarized in appendices A and B for easy reference).
3.1. Galois Fields
This treatment of Galois Fields is neither rigorous nor exhaustive, we begin by stat
ing several useful results from Gilbert [Gilb76]. The interested reader is referred to the
source for proof of the theorems.
3.1.1. Definitions and Theorems
Definition 1: Commutative Ring
A commutative ring (R, +, ) is a set R, together with two binary operations +
and on R satisfying the following axioms. For any a, b, c e R,
(i) associativity of addition - (a + b) + c = a + (b + c );
(ii) commutativity of addition - a +b = b +a;
(iii) existence of additive identity - there exists 0 R called the zero
such that a + 0 = a ;
(iv) existence of additive inverse - there exists -a e R such that
a +(-a) = 0;
(v) associativity of multiplication (a b ) c = a-(b c );
(vi) commutativity ofmultiplication - a b = b -a;
(vii) existence of multiplicative identity - there exists 1 e R such that
*
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a 1 = a;
(viii) mutual distributivity of multiplication and addition
a (b +c ) = a -b + a -c and (b +c ) a = b-a +c-a.
Definition 2: Field
A field is a commutative ring having more than one element and satisfying the
following additional axiom,
(ix) existence of multiplicative inverse - for each a e R there exists a-1
e R such that a -a-1= 1.
Definition 3: Polynomial Ring
The set of all polynomials in x with coefficients from the commutative ring R is
denoted by R[x]. That is,
R[x] = {a0 + axx + a2x2 + +atlxn:aieR,n>0}.
This forms a commutative ring (R [x ], +, ) called the polynomial ring with coeffi
cients from R where addition and multiplication of the polynomials
are defined by
and
P(x) =
Yiaix'
anc* q(x) =
YjbiX1
t'=0 i=0
max (m,n)
p(x) + q(x)=
(ai+b^x*
i=0
p(x)-q(x)= " ckXk where ck = a{bj.
fc=0 i+j=k
Definition 4: Reducible Polynomial
A polynomial f (x) is said to be reducible over the ring (or field) F if it can be
factored into two (non-constant) polynomials in F[x], otherwise f(x) is called
irreducible.
Theorem 5
The ring F[x]/(p(x)) is a field if and only if p(x) is irreducible over the field
F, where the notation F[x]/(p(x)) denotes the set of residues {/ (x) mod
p(x):f(x)eF[x}).
Theorem 6
If F is a finite field, it has pm elements for some prime p and some integer m .
The prime p is called the characteristic of F and is the smallest nonzero integer
such that p-\ =0. Furthermore, all fields having pm elements are isomorphic to
each other.
Definition 7: Galois Field
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A finite field with pm elements is called a Galois field of order pm and is
denoted by GF(pm); they are unique up to isomorphism.
3.1.2. Representation of a Galois Field
The Galois field GF(pn) may be represented as the set of polynomials over 2ZP
modulo an irreducible polynomial / (x ) of degree n . That is
GF(pn) = Zp[x]/(f(x))
Thus we can represent the elements of the field by choosing the polynomials of degree
< n-\ with coefficients from ^p as equivalence class representatives. In the following
we will use "polynomial" to mean "polynomial modulo some irreducible polynomial". For
instance our representation of the field GF(53) will include the polynomials
x2
+ 4x+2, (1)
or
2x, (2)
but not:
2x3 + 8x2 + 4x. (3)
A degree m polynomial is called monic (of degree m ) if the coefficient of the xm term is
1 , so ( 1 ) above is monic of degree 2.
The operations of "+" and "" are similar to polynomial addition and multiplication
learned in elementary algebra: Addition consists of adding the coefficients of
corresponding terms and multiplication is accomplished by multiplying each term of the
first polynomial by each term of the second, then combining like terms. For example, if
we multiply (1) and (2) above, (3) results. Note however that these operations are per
formed modulo some / (x ). So, for instance if we take (3) modulo f (t) =
x3
+ x + 1 then
the resulting polynomial,
3x2 + 2x +4, is a valid equivalence class representative. This
amounts to dividing the result of the elementary operations above by f (x) and taking
the remainder as the final result, a member of GF(pn). If we can find such an / (x), we
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will have defined a field satisfying all of the necessary properties. Thus we write
GF(p-) = Zp[x]/(f(x)).
3.1.3. Primitive Elements
A (multiplicative) generator of a Galois field, a e GF(pn), has the following special
property:
a* takes on the value of each nonzero field element exactly once as / ranges
through the natural numbers 1 pn-\. Thus we denote the elements of GF(pn) as
{0, a, a2, , a" _1}. There may be more than one generator for a field, these elements
are collectively called primitive elements of the field5. This representation allows us to
easily multiply in the field. For instance, in GF(c),
aa-ab =aa+bf*^-1).
The following theorem is the basis of our algorithm to construct fields.
Theorem 8
Given any n -degree monic polynomial / over GF(p) and a e GF(pn), then a is
primitive, and / is irreducible over GF (p ) if and only if
(1) ak (mod / ) 4 1 for all k <pk-\\
(2)aph-l (mod/) = 1.
These criteria are to be used by this implementation to decide whether a randomly
selected pair / and a define a field.
3.1.4. Discrete Logarithms
Say we have selected a primitive element a e GF(pn) = 2Z,p[x]/(f (x)). Then
clearly as m ranges through the integers 1,2, ,pn-\,
am
('mod / ) takes on the value
of each nonzero field element exactly once. Conversely, to each nonzero field element A
we associate the integer m , and say that m is the logarithm to the base a of A . So the
5In fact there are always
<j>(pn1) primitive elements in GF(pn), where <j> is the Euler totient.
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notation
m = \oga(A )
is used to express the inverse of A = am (mod / (x ) ), the exponentiation function. We
consider the logarithm to be an integral value in the range 1,2, ,pn-\, and use
pn-\ =loga(l).
The calculation of m is called the discrete logarithm problem. When the order of
GF(pn) is small one may tabulate the field elements with their associated logarithms,
then perform a search. If however the field is large enough, this will not be possible. In
this case the discrete logarithm problem is relatively difficult: No polynomial time algo
rithm is known for arbitrary fields. On the other hand it is relatively easy (polynomial
time) to exponentiate. Despite this, there are practical algorithms for fields having spe
cial properties. Odlyzko has recently cataloged and critiqued many of these techniques
[Odly86a, Odl86b]. One is the Coppersmith algorithm for fields GF(2n) (where
n <~400) [Copp84]. Another is the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm which is applicable to
GF(q) when q-\ has small prime factors only [Pohl78]. We chose the latter algorithm
for the current project since it is more general in scope.
3.1.5. Construction of a Galois Field
To illustrate the above concepts we give a simple example. We wish to construct
GF(4), using our polynomial representation. Since 4 = 22, we can construct such a field
if we can find an irreducible polynomial of degree 2 over 72.
By trial and error, we find the polynomial p(x) =
x2 + x +1 is irreducible because
p(0) = 1 and p(l) = 3
= I (mod 2), which implies that p has no factors in ^2.
Next we try to find a generator of the field, a. In this case the polynomials x and
x + 1 are both primitive elements. If we select a = x as our generator the following
representation of GF(4) results:
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0 = Ox + 0
a = x
a2
= x + 1
a3
= 1
Figure 1.1. GF(4) = ^2[x]/(x2 + x + 1)
3.1.6. Field Extensions
As a result of the previous sections, we have a field GF(q) where q
=pnfor some
prime /?, represented as {0,a, ,at~1). We now wish to construct a field GF(qm) for
some m > 1, called the m-degree extension of GF(q). We will call GF(g) the 6as<? field.
The field extension will be represented as the set of polynomials over GF(q) modulo an
irreducible polynomial f (t) of degree m. Thus we can represent the elements of
GF(qm) by choosing the polynomials of degree < m with coefficients from the base field,
{0, a, a2, 1}, as equivalence class representativities.
We proceed in a manner analogous to the one used to construct the base field.
That is, generator g is found and the nonzero
"polynomials"
comprising the field exten
sion are represented as powers of g. Notice that this representation of GF(qm) is iso
morphic (by Theorem 6) to the field GF(pnm), so p is again the characteristic of the
field. This relationship is shown pictorially in figure 1.2.
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GF(qm) = {0,g, ,^*m-1} = GF(pmn) = {0,a, ,a"m'1-1}
C7F(tf) = {0,a, ,a*-1}
Figure 1.2. Relationship between Base Field and Field Extension.
Continuing with our example, we now construct GF(43), an extension of GF(4).
First we find an irreducible polynomial, f(t), of degree 3 over GF(4); f(t) = a3t3+ a3
works. Next we find a generator which we will now call g. The polynomials (modulo
f (t) ) comprising the field will have degree < 2, and we find that g = a3t + a3 is indeed
a primitive element. The entire field is given in appendix A, due to its size, and for con
venience in subsequent examples. Notice that g63= a3= 1, while no other elements are
1, so g is a generator.
We need one more concept to prove the Bose-Chowla theorem in the next section.
If E is a field extension of F, the element e e E is algebraic of degree n over F if n is
the smallest integer and there exist a0,au ,an e F , not all zero, such that
a0 + aie +
+anen
= 0.
In other words, the minimal polynomial in F having e as its root is of degree n .
3.2. The Bose-Chowla Theorem
We have now provided the necessary background to provide a proof of the Bose-
Chowla theorem [Bose62]. This version of the theorem was slightly modified by Chor
from the original to better suit the application, and we have further extended Chor's ver
sion to suit our implementation of the Chor-Rivest system (we have allowed p to be a
prime power). This theorem demonstrates that we can form a p element knapsack vec-
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tor U whose h -fold sums are unique. At the same time the magnitude of each knapsack
elements is confined to a polynomial (ph) range, so high density is insured. For contrast,
consider a superincreasing knapsack of p elements where successive elements are grow
ing exponentially, rather than polynomially.
The Bose-Chowla Theorem
Let p be a prime power, h > 2 an integer. Then there exists a vector
5*
= {a-i : 0 < / < p - 1 } of integers such that
1. l<a{<ph-l (i=0,l,---,p-l);
2. If (x0,X!, ,xp_!) and (yQ,yi, ,yp-i) are two distinct vectors
with non-negative integral coordinates and
P-i P-i
t'=0 t'=0
then
p-i P-i
E*.fl.- 4 E^.-a.--
'=0 t'=0
PROOF
Consider the Galois field GF(p) having distinct elements a0 = 0,a!, ,ap_x.
Let g be a primitive element of GF(ph), an h -degree extension of the field
GF(p). That is g is a generator of the multiplicative group of nonzero elements
in GF(ph).
Let t be algebraic of degree h over GF(p), and consider GF(ph) = GF(p)(t).
Construct vector a* = (a0,ax, ,p_i) where
a{ = log(f +<*,-), i =0, 1 (1)
and suppose that
P-i p-i
Ex,- a,- = Ey.tf.- (2)
s=0 t'=0
Then in GF(ph) we have
so,
gi=0
=
i=0
'=0 '=0
Expanding these products, we obtain
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(t +a0)x% +Ql)Sl -"{t +*p-1)Xp-1 = (t +a0)y(t +ai)yi (t
+ap_lf"-1
Since x" and f are distinct, and the sum of their elements is h , both sides of the
above equation represent distinct monic polynomials of degree h. We now
subtract these to yield a nonzero polynomial of degree <h with coefficients in
GF(p) that equals zero.
Hence, t is a root of this polynomial, contradicting the fact that t is algebraic of
degree h over GF(p).
Therefore, assumption (2) leads to a contradiction.
QED
Our method of constructing knapsacks in this scheme is to mimic this construction
of a*. For example, in the field GF(43) tabulated in appendix A we obtain
a*
= (56, 1,58,25), which may be easily verified for compliance with the Bose-Chowla
theorem. That is, any 3-fold sum (repetitions allowed) is unique.
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CHAPTER 2
Project Description
1. How the Chor-Rivest Cryptosystem Works
1.1. Key Generation
Creation of the key pair, the most demanding phase of this public key cryptosys
tem, is outlined in figure 2.1. The first step is to find a prime power p and a positive
integer h <p such that discrete logarithms over GF(ph) may be easily computed (i.e.
(1) Let p be a prime power, h <p an integer such that discrete logarithms in GF(ph)
can be efficiently computed (i.e. ph-\ factors into small factors only).
(2) Construct the Galois field GF(p), then compute and tabulate a+/3, a-/3, a-p and
a//3for alla,/3e GF(p).
(3) Find a monic degree h polynomial f (t) that is irreducible over GF(p), and g e
GF(ph), a multiplicative generator of GF(ph). We thus define GF(ph), an h -degree
extension of GF (p ), where arithmetic is done modulo / (/ ) over GF (p ) (using the
tables created in step 2). This is done by randomly selecting candidates for f (t)
and g until the properties
g 4 1 for all s | ph-\ and g" _1 = 1 are satisified.
(4) Construct the knapsack vector
a* following the Bose-Chowla theorem: Compute
at = logg(/ + /) for i = 0, 1, ,p-\.
(5) Scramble the knapsack
5* from the original ordering: Let tt:{0,1, ,p -1} -+
{0,1, ,p-l) be a randomly chosen permutation. Set b{ = a^y
(6) Add noise to the knapsack: Pick 0< d < ph-\ at random. Set c{ =b{+d.
(7) Public key - to be published: c0,cu ,cp_x;p,h.
(8) Private key - to be kept secret: f (t),g ,ir~~1, d .
Remark: Every user can use the same p and h . The probability of collisions (two users
having the same keys) is negligible.
Figure 2.1. Outline of key generation phase of Chor-Rivest [Chor85].
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p -1 factors into small factors only). Throughout the remainder of this paper, p and h
are reserved for these parameters. The desired span for these parameters is p < 256 and
h<25. In steps 2 and 3 of figure 2.1 a field GF(p) and its h -degree extension are
defined as described last chapter. However, the orders of field extensions we are
interested in, precludes computing and saving the entire field, so Theorem 8 is applied.
Step 4 is the Bose-Chowla construction, also covered previously, yielding a dense
knapsack vector, U. The Pohlig-Hellman algorithm ( 4.3) is used to extract logarithms.
This knapsack is scrambled using a random permutation, and a noise factor is
added to each element. This disguised knapsack T along with p and h form the public
encryption key. The elements t, g and the permutation applied to the knapsack consti
tute the private decryption key.
1.2. Encryption
Encryption, figure 2.2, proceeds as in previous knapsack systems. To encrypt a
binary message add the knapsack elements corresponding to a 1 bit in the plaintext.
Notice that this operation is very fast since only addition (modulo ph-\) is required.
The only complication here is that we must add very large numbers, exceeding the capa
city of a machine integer.
1.3. Decryption
Decryption, figure 2.3, based on exponentiation of the generator g, is more com
plex than encryption. In step 2, the noise factor d is removed from the ciphertext C giv
ing c . The generator is raised to the power c , resulting in degree h - 1 polynomial q (t ).
Recall that field elements are equivalence class representatives. In step 4 we are simply
finding the h -degree member s(t) of the equivalence class denoted by q(t) (that is,
q(t) = s(t) (mod /(*)))
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To encrypt a binary message ffi of length p and weight (number of l's) exactly h, into
the ciphertext C:
p-i
C = Yimi'ci (nod ph-l),
=o
where
c* is the knapsack contained in the public key.
Figure 2.2. Outline of encryption phase of Chor-Rivest [Chor85].
( 1 ) Let r (t) = t h mod / (t), a polynomial of degree < h - 1 .
(2) Given the ciphertext C, compute c = C -hd (mod ph-\).
(3) Compute q (t) = gc mod / (/), a polynomial of degree h-l.
(4) Add th-r(t) to q(t) to get 5(0 = th +q(t)-r(t), a polynomial of degree h in
GFoor/].
(5) We now have
s(t) = (t+i1)-(t+i2)---(t+ih)
namely s(t) factors to linear terms over GF(p). By successive substitutions, we
find the h roots ij 's. Apply tt_1to recover the coordinates of the original plaintext
message having the bit 1 .
Figure 2.3. Outline of decryption phase of Chor-Rivest [Chor85].
Since 5 (/ ) has degree h , we expect h roots for 5 (t ).
Observe that
s(t) = g"=g
x 2 \
where the a,-'s are h elements of the original (unscrambled, unpermuted) knapsack a*
formed in step 4 of the key generation. Each at is the logarithm of a linear polynomial,
thus, 5(0 has h linear factors! In step 5 the roots are found and unscrambled to reveal
the original plaintext.
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2. Functional Specification
2.1. Design Criteria
Figure 2.1 contains the remark that
Every user can use the same p and h. The probability of collisions (two users
having the same keys) is negligible.
Pursuit of this option imbues advantages to a system: Because these parameters are con
stants they can be hard-wired into the system along with several other important values
like the factorization of ph-\, and the size of polynomials in the fields. The system can
be tuned to the selected values, and coding tricks employed1, to achieve the greatest effi
ciency possible. Thus we expect Chor-Rivest installations to adopt a particular pair p
and h as a matter of course.
Our primary aim is to generate data for the cryptanalyst, so we need the capability
to emulate any given installation. That is the implementation described herein shall
operate for arbitrary choice of p and h within the constraints set forth in figure 2.4. The
third constraint derives from the choice of algorithm to compute discrete logarithms.
The Pohlig-Hellman algorithm, selected at the outset of the project, is the most general
discrete logarithm procedure recommended by the Chor [Pohl78, Chor85].
(1) p < 256 must be a prime power.
(2) h < 25 is a positive integer strictly less than p.
(3) The factorization of ph-\ may consist of at most 32 distinct primes, the largest
being less than 108.
Figure 2.4. Constraints on the choice of p and h .
This is particularly true for fields with characteristic 2.
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Secondarily, we aim to give the user control over the system. In particular, he must
have access to intermediate results and the ability to override normally randomly gen
erated values if he so desires.
The third major objective is that the implementation should be as efficient as possi
ble. The rational for ranking this objective is that the system is an analytical tool not a
production cryptosystem. Thus, where generality and efficiency are in conflict the
former will prevail. However, due to the complexity of the system, maximal efficiency
must be regarded as a critical goal. This is the impetus for selecting the C programming
language.
Two final objectives are all encompassing: The system shall be well documented
and easily modified, and it shall be immune to user error through the incorporation of
consistency checks and error messages. The design criteria are shown in table 2. 1 .
2.2. Functions Performed
There are three main functions performed by this system, corresponding to the
phases of the Chor-Rivest cryptosystem: a) System Generation, b) Encryption, and c)
Decryption. The first produces matched public/private key pairs to be used as inputs to
the Encryption and Decryption functions respectively. The encryption function accepts
the public key and a binary plaintext as input and outputs the ciphertext. Conversely,
the decryption function uses the private key to transform the ciphertext message back to
Table 2.1. Primary Design Concerns.
Rank Criteria
1 Easy to modify and well documented
2 Robust
3 Emulate most other installations
4 Allow maximal user control
5 Efficient
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the original plaintext.
2.3. Limitations and Restrictions
Keep in mind that this product is designed under the assumption that the cryp
tanalyst is the end user. No attempt is made to deliver a system that will be usable by a
community of potential correspondents. There are no provisions for establishing or
maintaining a public key directory nor are there any message passing protocols. These
concerns constitute a separate problem in the realm of networks and communication.
A further restriction, is on the format of messages accepted for encryption. In
selecting values for the system parameters the user also defines the allowable set of
plaintext messages. A message submitted to the enciphering facility must consist of pre
cisely p bits, h of which are ones (white space is ignored). There is no provision for the
arbitrary mappings of ASCII, EBCDIC, or natural language to this format.2
2.4. User Inputs
The parameters p and h as well as a file containing the
factorization3
of ph-\ are
required as command line arguments to the generate program. Additionally, if the
option to override random generation is selected (also a command line argument), the
user is prompted for several values.
The encryption and decryption programs require the appropriate key file to be the
first argument on the command line (unless options are selected). The remaining argu
ments are to be files containing binary plaintext or the multiprecision ciphertext respec
tively. An arbitrary number of message files may be submitted to either program. Addi
tionally, decrypt permits an arbitrary number of ciphertext messages within each file
2Chor provides simple algorithms for doing this [Chor85]. We chose not to incorporate them in order to
keep the primary algorithm clear.
3An auxiliary program factor, described in the users manual, will perform this factorization.
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(separated by a newline character).
2.5. User Outputs
If no options are specified, the program generate runs silently, creating two files
containing the keys for encryption and decryption. A verbose option is provided caus
ing important intermediate results to be printed to stdout. The dump option is similar to
the verbose option, except that it applies exclusively to values generated within the loga
rithm computations.
The program encrypt simply places the ciphertext produced on the stdout. If more
than one plaintext file was submitted for encryption, the associated ciphertext is output
one message per line, in order. This output may be redirected into a file to be submitted
to the deciphering function, since decrypt allows an arbitrary number of messages in
each ciphertext file.
The function decrypt also places each plaintext message on the stdout followed by a
newline character. To enhance readability, these binary messages have a space after
every forth bit. Like the generate command, a verbose option is provided, to reveal
intermediate results.
A clock option is also provided for the above commands. In the generate pro
cedure the time required for each step of the computation is output. In the encrypt and
decrypt functions, the time to transform each individual message is printed, as is the
time to load the key file and do initial calculations.
The system is very robust. If an error occurs, a message is placed on the stderr
file, and the program exits with a value of 1. Successful completion returns a value of 0.
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3. Changes to Original Scope
At the outset of this project an interactive system incorporating all phases of the
Chor-Rivest cryptosystem along with several additional functions to aid the cryptanalyst
was envisioned. Of course it was imperative to permit arbitrary choice of the parameters
p and h (in the proposed range) to emulate any other Chor-Rivest cryptosystem. These
objectives are conflicting however; there are simply not enough resources (space and
time) available on the systems at Rochester Institute of Technology. Even if sufficient
core were available, given the time requirements an interactive approach is not appropri
ate: One is more inclined to run the key generation as a background process under
UNIX.
In order to allow the user to manipulate intermediate values, all variables must be
accessible, regrettably this is not viable due to the complexity of computing logarithms.
Indeed, it is a struggle to accommodate the primary requirement for arbitrary system
parameters in the proposed range. A very frugal attitude toward storage evolved in this
programmer as the coding progressed, thus functions to take arbitrary logarithms, display
field elements or re-execute commands are not provided.
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CHAPTER 3
Implementation Details
1. Architectural Design
The advantages of a modular style in designing computer software are widely
recognized. To this end, the C language supports and encourages separate compilation
of files [Kern78]. Through disciplined programming, files can be equivalent to modules.
We assimilate this approach, so the system is split across several files, with related func
tions or header information collected in each file. In this chapter we describe the system
architecture, showing how the modules fit together to make up the system. The UNIX
make facility aids the programmer in this regard, allowing him to specify dependencies
among numerous files in a special file called the Makefile [Feld79]. The Makefile for this
system, reproduced in appendix C, supplies much the same information as this chapter,
but in a more concise and precise rendering. It should be perused before modifying, or
extracting any part of the system.
Four executable commands constitute the cryptosystem:
a) generate, the key generation facility;
b) encrypt, the encryption facility;
c) decrypt, the decryption facility;
d) factor, computes data necessary for key generation.
The main program for each command resides in a module of the same name, with a
".c"
suffix. These modules also contain high-level routines called by the given main program.
At the other extreme are the modules which house related low-level routines:
a) poly.c, the polynomial manipulation package;
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b) mp.c, the multiprecision package for handling huge integers;
c) error.c, routines to handle various system errors;
d) utility.c, miscellaneous low-level routines.
The functions in these files are primitive operations for the routines in the other files.
Similarly, low level definitions and declarations utilized by all program units are encap
sulated in modules:
a) typesh, global typedefs, macro definitions and constants;
b) mph, constants and macros used in the multiprecision package;
c) globalc, declarations of global variables.
These universally accessible units are examined in detail in 3 of this chapter.
The remaining modules are for the major subphases of the key generation phase of
the cryptosystem:
a) gfc, to construct Galois fields;
b) logarithms, the Pohlig-Hellman discrete logarithm procedure;
c) chinesex, the Chinese remaindering technique.
Isolating these fosters easy modification, replacement, or transfer to another application.
The bulk of the programming effort centered on the procedures contained in these
modules and scrutinized in chapter 4.
2. Naming Conventions
To enhance the readability and modifiability of the code, some guidelines for iden
tifier names were adopted. Of course, names of variables and constants suggest their
purpose as much as possible. Where published algorithms have been used, the source is
referenced in a comment, and the same variable names are used if possible. The names
from Chor's specification of the cryptosystem take precedence if there is a conflict
[Chor85].
If a variable is a polynomial, it has the form a_b where a is its name and b is the
formal variable. Again to be consistent with Chor, t is the formal variable for elements
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of the field extension whereas x implies a polynomial in the base field. So for instance,
the variable g_t holds the polynomial g(t), the generator of the field extension.
A function to manipulate polynomials exclusively in the field extension begins with
a capital letter, to distinguish it from the complementary function which acts over the
small field. An example is the pair Mult() and mult() to multiply elements of the respec
tive fields.
All externally visible multiprecision functions have entirely capitalized names, like
MULT() to multiply large integers.
3. Data Structures and Global Variables
There is a set of variables that so pervade the system it is desirable to make them
accessible to all routines. By doing so, we avoid cluttering functions with arguments that
are extraneous to their basic purpose. Even more importantly, we avoid the overhead of
stacking and unstacking these variables on each function call. Due to the intensive com
putations performed by this system, this is an efficiency concern that cannot be over
looked. The file globalc contains the declarations for all of these global variables.
The parameters p and h , the most heavily referenced variables of the system, are
declared to be short integers. These two and other values computed from them are the
largest subset of the global variables. The value of ph-\ is saved in the MP variable
p_h_ml, the logarithm to the base 2 of this number is kept in the int p_h_log. The
prime factorization of ph-\ is represented by the structure
struct prime_factorization {
int nf;
/* the number of prime factors */
int f[MAX_nf|; /* the prime factors */
int n[MAX_nfJ;
/* exponents of the factors */
int r[MAX_nfJ;
/*
relatively prime factors */
MP S[MAX_nf]; /* P_h_ml / f [i] */
}q;
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The relationship between the components of this structure are
tl/ -1 n/ -1
ph-i = n /w1'1 = n mi
=0 t=0
Table 3.1, shows the values structure components for the case p = 9 and h =3, where
ph-\ = 728 = 23-31-131.
Table 3.1. Components of struct prime factorization for p = 9, h = 3.
i mi nm rrn sm
0 2 3 8 364
1 7 1 7 104
2 13 1 13 56
The generator of the field GF(ph) is maintained as the global variable g_t. The
irreducible polynomial /_/ is also global.
The only other global variables are flags to control the amount of input and output
of the programs. These variables are set by the user as options on the command line,
and are referenced by many functions.
The file typesJi is a header file of type, macro and constant definitions that is
included in all of the source files. Constants are used to determine the space allocated at
compile time, as well as for error checking at run time. These constants, and their
current values are:
#define MAX_p 256
#define MAX_h 25
#define MAXJog 200
#define MAX_nf 32
#define SIZE 14
MAX_p and MAX_h are the maximum allowed values of the global system parameters
p and h. The values 256 and 25 are the largest
values proposed by Chor and Rivest
[Chor84]. MAXJog is the greatest value for \log2(ph-\)] used to allocate space for the
powers of 2 of the generator of the field extension GF(ph). Notice the consistency of
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these values: [log2(25625-l)l =200.
MAX_nf is the greatest number of factors permitted in the factorization of ph-\.
Because the Chinese remaindering technique uses a divide and conquer approach to
convert from modular notation to radix notation, efficient implementation requires that
MAX_nf is a power of 2: Our choice of 32 should cover all cases in our range of p and
h.
The constant SIZE is used to allocate space for multiprecision variables used by
the program. A multiprecision number is actually a representation of the given number
in base 230. The typedef for these large numbers is
#typedef int MP[SIZE];
where the zeroeth array element holds the number of
230 digits in the number. There
fore, we can represent numbers to 230 which is adequate for our purposes.
The other typedefs are
#typedef unsigned char coeff;
#typedef coeff *polynomial;
#typedef MP *knapsack;
Thus a polynomial variable is actually a pointer to coeff, short for coefficient.
Each is dynamically allocated according to its degree D via the macro
#define poly_alloc(D) (polynomial) calloc( (D+l), sizeof(coeff))
so a polynomial behaves as an array of coefficients, where the index corresponds to the
power of the formal variable. In field GF(p) the coefficients are from the ring 7p. The
coefficients of GF(ph), on the other hand, are elements of GF(p) expressed as powers of
the generator a. For example, consider x(t) e GF(43):
x(t)
=a3t2+ a2.
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In the internal representation of this polynomial, we store only the powers of a or zero1:
xj- (2,0,3).
Type coeff is synonymous with the base type unsigned char. This rather uncommon
type is an eight bit byte on most machines, providing the decimal range 0 255.
Inasmuch as MAX_p - 1 = 255 is the maximum value to be encountered (in either field),
this type is tailor made for this implementation. If the constant MAX_p is increased,
then this typedef needs to be changed accordingly.
A similar macro is used to dynamically allocate space for a knapsack which is a
vector of multiprecision numbers having A elements:
#define knapsack_alloc(A) (knapsack) calloc( (A), sizeof(MP))
xThe case a0 = 1 never arises in our implementation, only
a"
-1 is used to denote 1. Thus the value
0 as a coefficient is handled as a special case: it always means 0 not a
.
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CHAPTER 4
Algorithm Design and Analysis
In this chapter we examine the primary algorithms needed to implement the Chor-
Rivest cryptosystem. The polynomial routines are presented first, since the field con
struction and discrete logarithm procedures use these as primitive operations.
1. Polynomial Manipulation
1.1. Multiplication of Field Elements
The procedure Mult( u_t, v_t, r_t ), shown in figure 4.1, multiplies polynomials
u(t) and v(t) over GF(ph) placing the residue modulo the irreducible polynomial / (t ) in
r (t ). This is the most heavily used code in the system - profiling the execution of gen
erate over moderately sized fields (order ~1025) reveals that
a) Mult() is called in the neighborhood of 250,000 times,
b) accounting for roughly 80% of the execution time.
First x = u v is found (step 1), if the degree of x (step 2) exceeds h, the degree of
the irreducible polynomial /, then x // is found (step 3) and the remainder is placed
in r (step 4). The calls to plus(), times(), minusf), and div() return the results of arith
metic on the coefficients over GF(p). Each of steps 1 and 3 require h2 of these basic
operations, so the overall complexity is 0(2h2). For efficiency's sake, these are macros
which do a table lookup of precomputed values.
Since this Mult() is compulsory for decryption, the arithmetic tables over GF(p)
must somehow be made available to the decryption facility. We admit the addition and
multiplication tables to the private key, then compute the subtraction and division tables
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Mult( u_t, v_t, r_t ) /* r = u * v (mod f_t) in GF */
polynomial u_t, v_t, r_t;
{
extern short p, h; /* for GF( pAh )*/
extern polynomial f_t; /* irreducible */
short i, j, q, m, x_t[2*MAX_h+l];
for ( i 0; i < 2*h; i++ ) x_t[i] = 0; /* init x */
1. for ( i = 0; i < h; i++ ) /* x = u * v */
for ( j = 0; j < h; j++)
x_t[i+j] = plus( x_t[i+j], times( u_t[i], v_t[j] ));
2. for ( m = 2*(h-l); x_t[m] == 0; m- ) /* find degree */
; /* ofx */
3. for ( i = m-h; i >= 0; -i ) { /* x = x % f_t */
q = div( x_t[h+i], f_t[h] );
for ( j = h+i-1; j >= i; -j )
x_t[j] = minus( x_t[j], times( q, f_t[j-i] ));
}
4. for ( j = 0; j < h; j++ ) /* put remainder*/
r_t[j] = x_t[j]; /* intor */
}
Figure 4.1. Function to multiply field elements.
from these.
1.2. Exponentiation of Polynomials
In figure 4.2 the function Raise
_poly(
x_t, e, r_t ) computes r(t) = xe(t), by com
bining the powers of two in the binary expansion of e . Initially the result is set to one,
and the current power of x , called xp is set to zero. If e is odd, then the result is multi
plied by x raised to the 2xp power. Then xp is incremented, and e is halved (integer
division). The steps are repeated until the value of e reaches zero, so at most 2h log p
modular multiplications are needed. The procedure Multf) entails at most 2/z2 primitive
operations over the base field. Consequently 4h3 log p operations over GF(p) will suf
fice to exponentiate over GF(ph).
38
Raise_poly( x_t, e, r_t ) /* exponentiate polys */
polynomial x t, r t; r over GF /
MPc;
{
i*
r = xAe */
short i;
coeff xp t[MAX h]; i* curr pwr of 2 of x */
MP ex;
ASSIGN( ex, e ); i* copy so no side eff */
for ( i = 1; i < h; i++ ) r initialize result */
r_t[i] = 0; /* to const poly */
r_t[0] = p-1; /* "one" */
for (i = 0; i < h; i++) /* initialize xp t to */
xp_t[i] = x_t[i]; r x_t */
while (COMP( ex, ZERO )) {
if(ex[l]& 1) r ex odd ? */
Mult( r__Lxp_.t. r J);
Mult( xp t, xp .t. XP_.t);
}
HALF(ex);
}
Figure 4.2. Procedure to exponentiate a polynomial over GF(ph).
1.3. Evaluation of Polynomials
Horner's Rule (also known as synthetic division) has been shown to require the
least number of additions and multiplications to evaluate a polynomial [Aho74]. Observe
that a polynomial
f(x) = ao + axx +a2x2+ +ax"+
may be expressed as
f(x) = a0 + *(ai + *(fl2 +*(-- xan) ))).
This observation is the basis of Horner's Rule which is shown in coded form in figure
4.3 (for the field extension).
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coeff Evaluate( a, x, n ) /* Horner's Rule over GF */
polynomial a; coeff x;
short n;
{
coeff total;
total = a[n];
while ( n >= 0 )
total = plus(times(total, x), a[n]);
return total;
Figure 4.3. Function to evaluate a polynomial using Horner's Rule.
1.4. Generation of Random Polynomials
The function rndm_poly( u, a, b, d ) forms a somewhat random polynomial u of
degree d. When the second argument a is not zero, then the leading coefficient of u will
be set to a ; with a = 1 this forces a monic polynomial. The third argument b defines
the upper limit on the value of each coefficient in u , thus this procedure works for both
the base field or its extension.
The function works by setting each coefficient to
random () % b ,
where randomf) is the C library function returning a pseudorandom
integer.1 If per
chance the constant term is zero (implying that zero is a root), it is changed to one
instead.
To select a candidate polynomial /(f) hopefully irreducible over GF(ph) use the
procedure Irreduciblef f_t ). This procedure begins with a call to rndm_poly() for a
monic degree h polynomial over GF(p), then employs some hueristics to improve its
function randomQ is not available on all UNIX systems. An alternative
is the older randQ.
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chances for irreducibility.
The first hueristic is that a sparse polynomial is more likely irreducible than a
dense polynomial, since every missing term i precludes at least one pair of factors having
degrees totaling /'. However, the polynomial received from rndm_poly() will never be
sparse due to the nature of the function randomf). We thus make a random number
(between 1 and h-l) of coefficients zero.
This sparse polynomial is then checked for linear factors using Evaluate() for each
element of GF(p). If a root is found we start a new, and repeat the hueristics until a
suitable candidate is produced.
While one could add several other tests, to the extreme of completely factoring a
candidate, experience has showed that this is not prudent. For GF (19724), as an exam
ple, seventy candidates were tried before finding a legitimate irreducible polynomial
prior to the addition of the "sparsing step" to the code. Afterwards, only three attempts
were needed, while Irreducible() remains very fast.
2. Construction of Galois Fields
An algorithm to construct fields is central to the key generation. Two Galois fields
are created, the base field GF(p) and its h -degree extension, GF(ph). Two separate but
similar procedures are needed, compute_gf() and compute_GF(),respectively. The
major difference is that in the former arithmetic is over the ring of integers modulo the
characteristic of the field, whereas in the latter arithmetic is over the base field
expressed as powers of the generator. In fact, once tables have been made for arithmetic
over GF(p), this field is discarded (dynamically allocated space is returned). During the
creation of these tables the entire field has to be resident in memory. This suggests the
only other difference between compute_gf() and compute
there is no way to store
all the elements of GF(ph) for the proposed magnitudes of p and h.
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Figure 4.4 is the code for compute_GF(), notice that only the powers of 2 of the
generator candidate g,
[g2'
| 0< <l0g2(/>k)}, are found in step 3. Having the powers
of 2 of the generator candidate in hand, we check to see if g[0] is indeed a primitive ele
ment, and whether t is algebraic over GF(p), following Theorem 8 of chapter 2. Step 4,
computes g_phm \_t = g"h-\ which if equal to 1 (actually the multiplicative identity,
p-l), satisfies half of the criteria for Theorem 8. The other half is checked in step 5:
compute_GF() /* define GF by finding f(t) & g-2Ai */
snort *; /* loop control var */
extern polynomial h_t[]; /* in logarithm.c */
polynomial g_phml_t; /* temporary polynomial */
1. for (i = 0; i <= p_h_log; i++) g[i] = poly_alloc( h-1 );
for (i = 0; i <= q.nf; i++) h_t[i] = poly_alloc( h-1 );
f_t = poly_alloc( h );
g_phml_t = poly_alloc( h-1 );
select_g:
2. Irreducible( f_t );
rndm_poIy( g[0], 0, p, h-1 );
3. for (i = 1; i <= p_h_log; i++) /* g to pwrs of 2 */
Mult( g[i-l], g[i-l], g[i] );
4. raise_g( p_h_ml, g_phml_t ); /* insure that g~pAh = 1 */
if ( !one( g_phml_t h-1, p-1 )) goto select_j;
5. for (i = 0; i < q.nf; i++) { /* g to p_h_ml /factors */
raise_g( q.S[i], h_t[i] );
if (one( g_phml_t, h-1, p-1) ) goto select^g;
6. for (i = 1; i <= p_h_log; i++) /* free all but g[0] */
cfree( g[i] );
}
Figure 4.4. Procedure to construct a Galois field, GF(ph).
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that g
* 4 1 where S{ = (ph-l)/fi, for each of the prime factors /, ofph-\. These spe
cial polynomials are saved in the array of polynomials h_t[ ] for later use in computing
logarithms. If either of these conditions is not satisfied, we simply start over, thus the
infamous goto statement best captures the essence of the algorithm, so it is unabashedly
used.
Step 1 of the code dynamically allocates space for the polynomials required, step 6
returns this space, except that the generator itself must be saved as part of the private
key.
The procedure raise_g() is a preconditioned form of the procedure Raise_poly( )
of figure 4.2, using the powers of 2 of g computed in step 3.
3. Discrete Logarithms
To fashion knapsacks according to the Bose-Chowla construction, we need a way
to determine logarithms of certain field elements. We choose the Pohlig-Hellman algo
rithm, applicable to arbitrary GF(ph), provided that ph-\ does not have a large prime
factor.
The objective is to find 1 < a <ph- 1 such that g" = x, given primitive element g
and some polynomial x in the field. This algorithm actually produces the vector a*, the
modular representation of a, where at =a modulo r,-. The relatively prime moduli
ri =
/i"4
where /, are prime and
n/_1
*
ph-\ = n /.-*
'=0
Chinese remaindering2is then employed to transform the vector of residues into its radix
equivalent. Each component of
a* is determined in the same manner, so the subscript i
2Chinese remaindering is a very old technique to transform numbers in modular notation to radix
notation. We have used Aho, Hopcroft and Ullman's procedure directly [Aho74].
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is dropped for clarity in the following.
We express a in base / as (bn^ b0),
n-l
a = (modr).
=o
The approach is to determine the b3- starting with the least significant digit b0, then a is
shifted to the right to find bx and so on. To do this, observe that
gu.
xgbn-2(Ph^)/f2x ... x
^M-lVf1-1
x
To find b0, raise x to the (ph-l)/f power:
y =x(ph-l)/f =ga(ph-l)/f =^(pfc-l)//)*0_
Because b0 is a base / digit, its possible values correspond to / possibilities for y:
H,H\ -,Hf-1
where H = g^ _1)// ; a search reveals y = H . Recall the array of polynomials h_t[]
saved during compute_GF(),these are the H1 for each factor / .
Having determined b0, the successive digits, bx bn-U are resolved by forming
y "-(g+P'')^"'.
and again searching for y = H 3 .
Clearly, if many logarithms are needed, it is wise to precompute, and perhaps sort,
the powers of H for each factor of ph-\. The complexity of this operation is a function
nf -1
of the sum of these prime factors, both in time and space: each of the E /' polynomi-
t'=0
als resulting are found via a polynomial multiplication. For perspective consider loga
rithm computations in GF(19724). There are nf = 18 factors whose sum approaches 16
million, hence about 16 million degree 23 polynomials are called for. In figure 4.5 we
present a C coded form of the algorithm, in single precision so as not to shroud the logic
too much. The code for large fields is identical except that many expressions must be
broken down into more primitive multiprecision function calls making the algorithm
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harder to follow.
Let us sketch this algorithm as it operates in the key generation phase of the Chor-
Rivest system. The insight gained will set the stage for the ensuing discussion of
improvements specific to this cryptosystem. Say we have selected p =9 and h =3, then
found a generator g of the field GF(93). Following the Bose-Chowla theorem, we need
to find the nine logarithms, log(f +/ ) for / = 0 8.
**
logarithm( x_t, a ) /* preconditioned pohlig-hellman algorithm */
mt a(]; /* the logarithm of x, as a vector of */
polynomial x_t; /* the residues, a mod q.f[i] */
int i, j, E, b, BP;
polynomial y_t, Y_t;
for ( i=0; i < q.nf; i++ ) { /* for each factor */
a[i] = 0; /* do initializations */
E = p_h_ml;
for ( j = 0; j < h; j++ ) Y_t[j] = x_t[j];
for ( j=0; j < q.n[i]; j++ ) {
E /= q-fW;
if(j!=0){ /* only if q.n[i] > 1 */
BP = b * power( q.f[i], j-1 );
Raise_poly( g_inv, BP, y_t );
Mult( Y_L y_t, Y_t );
}
Raise_poly( Y_t, E, y_t );
for ( b=0; b < q.f[i]; b++ )
if ( same_poly( y_t, H[i][b], h-1)) break;
a[i] += b
*
power( q.f[i], j ) % q.r[i];
}
}
return TRUE;
Figure 4.5. C implementation of the Pohlig-Hellman Algorithm.
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The preconditioning requires the factorization ph-\ = 728 = 23-7- 13. It is
apparent that three lists of polynomials are needed having lengths 2, 7, and 13, we will
call these lists H2, H7 and H13 in this example. After computing and saving these 22
polynomials we are ready to compute arbitrary logarithms to the base g.
Each call to logarithm will return a three element vector
a*
= (a0(mod 2),ax(mod 1), a2(mod 13)),
which will be converted into an integer between 0 and 728 by Chinese remaindering.
Determining a0 is more difficult than ax or a2 since the loop marked '**' in figure 4.5
must be traversed three times. In each traversal we do some arithmetic to form the poly
nomial y , which must match one of the two polynomials in the list H2. As the positions
of the three matches are found they are combined to form Go-
Moving on to a ! we see that we only have to form the polynomial y once, then find
its position in the list H7. The case for a3 is analogous to a2.
We improve the practical behavior of the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm for this applica
tion by capitalizing on the the following observations:
a) we are interested in precisely p logarithms;
b) most of the factors ofph-\ are raised to the power of unity.
c) the values a{ are independent and may be computed in any order.
The first refinement we make is to compute a0 for each of the p logarithms needed, then
we compute all of the axs, and so on. By doing so we realize a fantastic savings in
space, for we can do the preconditioning in stages. For the example above, we would
first construct the list H2, then compute a0 for the nine logarithms needed. At this point
we are done with list H2. As a result we only need space to save a number of polynomi
als equal to the largest factor of ph-\, plus the rather trivial table to store each
a*
(p of
them).
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The next refinement is not as obvious, and works only when the current factor /,-
appears in the first power (, = 1). But since this property applies to most factors of
ph-\ it is worthwhile. More importantly, usually only the very smallest factors are
raised to powers greater than one. The trick is to do the algorithm backwards. That is,
we compute and save the p polynomials y for the current factor, then generate the poly
nomials Hf .. As each element of H is computed it is checked for a match with the p
polynomials, then it is discarded. This approach reduces the number of polynomials
stored from max ( /, ) to /? .
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CHAPTER 5
System Performance
The system has been subjected to a battery of test cases, shown in figure 5.1, to
verify correct performance. For each test case a minimum of five messages were suc
cessfully encrypted and decrypted following key generation.
Table 5.1. Test Cases
P h
factorizatio
number factors
nof^-l
largest factor
97 12 12 3,169
103 12 13 31,357
113 12 12 4,219
125 9 8 31,051
128 9 6 649,657
128 12 12 14,449
151 12 11 8,522,341
197 10 9 77,081
197 12 13 36,013
197 24 18 10,316,017
211 12 14 8,655,349
243 18 16 927,001
256 9 12 38,337
The trials incorporate values of p, alternately a prime and a prime power, spanning the
allowable range.
Having thus validated the system, we turn our attention to the viability of the
Chor-Rivest cryptosystem based on our experiences here. To settle this qualitative issue
one must consider two elementary questions:
1) Is the security of the cryptosystem satisfactory?
2) Is the efficiency of the cryptosystem satisfactory?
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to data and analysis to help the potential user
48
judge the applicability of the system to his needs.
1. Security of the Chor-Rivest Cryptosystem
Having no secret information available, one is limited to two known modes of
attack on the cryptosystem: brute force or low density. Both of these will attack only a
given instance of the subset sum problem, that is, only one message is revealed.
There are [jJJ ways to choose h of p elements. In the brute force attack one sys
tematically tries all of the possibilities until h elements are found whose sum matches the
ciphertext. Chor and Rivest propose an algorithm with an expected run time of
For p and h in the vicinity of 200 and 25 the brute force attack is impractical requiring
more than 258 operations [Chor84]. However smaller values of p and h may well suc
cumb to exhaustive search attacks.
Low density attacks proposed to date may be expected to work up to knapsack
densities of 1.0 [Laga83,Radz86]. Chor and Rivest report that the L3 algorithm was
unsuccessful for the knapsacks created with GF (19724) as well as GF(10312) [Chor84].
Of course it is hoped that this implementation will in some way help to advance the state
of the art in this area.
It is impossible to determine the private key, even if the above attacks are success
ful. Thus, if the message is useful for only a limited time, normal decryption will most
certainly be faster than cryptanalysis. To reconstruct the private key one almost cer
tainly has to have a portion of the secret information. The cryptographers have demon
strated that if the noise factor d and any other component of the private key are known
then the rest of the key can be construed [Chor84].
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2. Efficiency of the Chor-Rivest Cryptosystem
Three components of efficiency are considered: time, space and information rate.
For most cryptographic applications, reasonably fast encryption and decryption are tan
tamount concerns. Also the keys should be compact: this is particularly true in a public
key cryptosystem, where the public keys must be maintained in a universally accessible
file perhaps, on several machines. Finally, a high information rate is desirable: this
implies low data expansion incurred by encryption. Certainly, as the number of bits
transmitted is lessened, the speed and cost of operation improves.
2.1. Time Requirements
In the class of public key cryptosystems, it is understood that the key generation is
necessarily complex to impart security to the system. Being a one-time computation for
each user, we can afford to be lenient in our expectations for this phase. Despite this,
the twenty three hours (table 5.2) required by our implementation for p =243, h = 18
would undoubtly discourage use of the system without some overhaul.
Table 5.2. Run Time Statistics
p h
largest
factor
Processor Time (DEC VAX11 780)
construct GF logarithms encrypt decrypt
97 12 3,169 0:00:35.52 0:36:29.11 0:00:00.07 0:00:01.23
103 12 31,357 0:00:42.82 0:42:44.54 0:00:00.05 0:00:01.33
113 12 4,219 0:01:27.75 0:41:22.99 0:00:00.07 0:00:01.40
125 9 31,051 0:01:00.78 0:15:07.92 0:00:00.07 0:00:00.72
128 12 14,449 0:01:19.47 0:39:20.25 0:00:00.08 0:00:01.47
197 12 36,013 0:03:43.67 1:37:29.55 0:00:00.12 0:00:01.67
243 18 927,001 0:07:07.15 22:50:37.56 0:00:00.08 0:00:05.00
256 9 38,737 0:09:27.85 0:44:49.27 0:00:00.12 0:00:00.87
On the positive side, Chor reports that his implementation, specific to GF (19724)
requires only "a couple of hours on a
minicomputer"to generate the system [Chor85].
Encrypting a message of length p and weight h is very fast, requiring the addition
of h integers each less than ph. Decryption, dominated by exponentiation over the field
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GF(ph), is considerably slower. At most 2/z log p multiplications are needed where each
multiplication consists of 2h2 operations using the algorithms of chapter 4. A total of
4/z3
log p operations are needed for decryption.
2.2. Space Requirements
The public key used to encrypt messages with length p and weight h consists of p
numbers, 1 < c,- <ph-l. In this implementation, we have placed the keys in text files, for
simplicity and human readability. Where a key directory must be maintained, binary
files should be used. The size of a single public key is then p\og2ph = p h log2 p bits.
The private key, a lesser concern, is also much smaller than the public key. Its
four components are two polynomials, a p element permutation and an integer less than
ph-\. The polynomials having degrees h and h - 1 require one byte for each coefficient
or 2h + 1 bytes total. Each element of the permutation will also fit in a single eight bit
byte for the proposed range of p and h . The size in bits of the private key is then
| private key | < 8((2/z + 1) + p) + Mog2 p.
We have again placed the private key in a text file, but had to add information specifying
the underlying field (i.e. the addition and multiplication tables over GF(p)). It would be
simple to replace this format with binary files for an actual cryptosystem, and the addi
tional information could be dropped, being common to everybody in the system.
2.3. Information Rate
As noted in chapter 1, the density of a knapsack gives an indication of the informa
tion rate R . Thus high density knapsacks offer a twofold advantage: not only is security
heightened, but efficiency also benefits. Recall the definition R
= log2 | M | /N where
M is the message space and N is the number of bits in the ciphertext. In the
Chor-
Rivest scheme the message space is |jj] and the ciphertext contains log2 ph bits, so
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R =1g(j)
/log2Pfe
Table 5.3 summarizes the information rate for several cases.
Table 5.3. Information Rate R vs. Knapsack Density d
P h d R
97 12 1.21 1.05
103 12 1.27 1.11
113 12 1.38 1.22
125 9 1.98 1.82
128 9 2.03 1.83
128 12 1.52 1.34
151 12 1.74 1.31
197 10 2.56 1.30
197 12 2.14 1.24
197 24 1.08 .56
211 12 2.27 1.23
243 18 1.70 .76
256 9 3.56 1.60
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusions and Recommendations for Future Work
1. Problems Encountered and Solved
Early versions of this system were impractical due to slow execution, particularly in
the system generation phase. Profiling the execution of several moderately sized test
cases revealed that the program was spending most of its time in functions minus() and
div(), which subtract and divide elements of GF(p). These functions are primitive
operations of the function Mult() to multiply elements of GF(ph). By precomputing
these values and replacing the functions with table lookups, a massive time savings was
realized in exchange for the trivial space required for the tables (each a p x p array of
unsigned char).
Further modifications to Mult() yielded still better response. Originally, this func
tion was very general, accepting as arguments the two polynomials to be multiplied, the
polynomial modulus, and the degree of each. By taking advantage of the knowledge that
the modulus is always a monic h -degree polynomial, and that the multiplicands have
degree at most h-l, the procedure was streamlined to the form presented in chapter 4.
For instance the system generation time for GF (10312) was reduced from about eight
hours to less than two hours with these simple modifications!
Running this version of the program with larger choice of h uncovered another
shortcoming, this one in the code to construct GF(ph).
Once again, the code, though
correct, required an
unacceptable amount of time to do the computation. Chor's
prescription for this phase of the computation is to select at random a degree h monic
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polynomial /, irreducible over GF(p). Given / irreducible we are to find a primitive
element g of GF(ph) by randomly selecting an reGF(Ph) until one is found which satis
fies r(p -1)/' 4 1 for all prime factors 5 of ph - 1.
Our approach was to select / at random, but not necessarily irreducible (we did
however check that / had no linear factors). By imposing the additional constraint that
A" _1) = 1, it was felt that the programming required to explicitly test irreducibility could
be avoided. However, the system ran unacceptably slow until the hueristics described in
chapter 4 were added.
Time was not the only resource to pose problems. The space requirements of the
Pohlig-Hellman algorithm as originally originally implemented were extraordinary: We
exhausted the available core part way through the logarithm preconditioning for the
interesting values of p and h. The first response to this enigma was to reduce the
amount of space required by the program. A major modification ensued, in which every
variable was scrutinized and if possible reduced to short or char rather than integer type.
The size of multiprecision variables was also halved, and some static variables were con
verted to automatic variables. After three weeks of squeezing space out of the system,
the Gordian Knot was finally cut with the realization that the precomputation could fol
low the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm proper for this application.
2. Discrepancies and Shortcomings of the System
This implementation works for fields that are amenable to discrete logarithm calcu
lations using the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm. Unfortunately, due to the generality imposed
on the system, key generation is quite slow. An estimate of the run time for the generate
command (in hours) is obtained by summing the distinct factors of ph-\ then dividing
by 275K.
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Of the recommended values for p and h given by Chor, all may be run with this
program except GF(25625) since the largest factor (3,173,389,601) of 20025-l does not
fit in a VAX machine word. It seems necessary to use the Coppersmith algorithm to
evaluate logarithms in this field [Copp84]. However, using this alternative would actu
ally impose more restriction on the choice of fields, since Coppersmith works only for
fields of characteristic 2.
3. Recommendations for Future Work
The most obvious extension of the project presented here would be to use the pro
gram as it was originally intended. That is, to try to break the Chor-Rivest scheme. The
most promising approach seems to be Radziszowski and Kreher's algorithm further
modified to handle higher density knapsacks [Radz86].
Another obvious extension is to transform the code into an actual cryptosystem
replete with a public key directory and the associated protocols for message passing and
maintenance of this directory. Recall that the system parameters p and h would in this
case be constant, rather than variable as in the current code. This would open the door
for numerous efficiency improvements.
The greatest gains could be realized by fixing p to a power of 2. In this case, the
faster Coppersmith algorithm could replace the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm for discrete
logarithm calculations. Arithmetic would also be simplified in GF(2n) since addition and
subtraction are identical, and bit operations could replace slower integer arithmetic.
Certain other efficiency gains result regardless of the choice of p and h , as long as
they are constant values. Several values that need to be computed at each system gen
eration in the present version could be hard-wired into the system. Included in this set
are the factorization of ph-\, and the results of the Chinese remandering precomputa-
tion. A significant time savings would result from eliminating the factoring step. Addi-
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tionally, storage required for key generation, encryption and decryption could be allo
cated at compile time, rather than dynamically at run time. Not only would time con
suming calls to the operating system storage allocator be eliminated, but the code would
be much simpler. The error checking currently required (in case there is no core avail
able) could be eliminated, as well as all garbage- collecting code. Finally, the multipreci
sion package could be modified to take advantage of the known ranges of the program
variables. Thus, it would be a very interesting project to modify the current program to
a usable public key cryptosystem.
Perhaps even more exciting, is the discrete logarithm problem itself. By extracting
the code to construct arbitrary Galois fields and the associated polynomial manipulation
routines, one could program several of the prominent algorithms for computing these log
arithms, then experimentally evaluate their relative run times. Using the code to con
struct arbitrary fields and the associated polynomial manipulation routines presented
herein, one could focus attention exclusively on the logarithm problem. A good place to
begin would be the cataloging of techniques by Odlyzko [Odly86]. This is by no means a
trivial project: Some state of the art techniques have not yet been completely analyzed
[Odly86].
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APPENDIX A
GF(64)
This field is constructed with the irreducible polynomial f(t) = a3t3+ a as the
modulus.
0 = 0/2 + 0f+0 g32=at2+a3
g=a3t+a3 g33 =
at2 + a3t + a
g2=a3t2
+
a3 g34
=
a2t2+ a2t+a
,3 3,2 . _3t , _2 35g =a3f +
a +c*2 **
= af
g4=at+a3 g36 =
ott2+ at
gb
=
af2 + a2f
+a3 g37 = at
+a2
6=a3f2 + af+a
-g
= at
2 + a3t +
a2
g7=a2t2
g39
= a2t2+at
g*
= a2f
2 + a3 tf
*
= a3f
2 +at
+a3
g=a2t2 + a3t
g41
= a2t2+a2t
+a2
g10
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at2 + a3t+a3
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g
= a
n=a2/2 + Q
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= at+a
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at2
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g4S
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= a3f2+a
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= a3f2+a3f
gM-a9t* + at
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=
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tf63
=
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APPENDIX B
Example Chor-Rivest Knapsack
For convinience the numbering of the steps involved in this example corresponds
to Chor's thesis [Chor85].
a. System Generation
1. Let p be a prime power, h < p an integer such that discrete logarithms in
GF(ph) can be efficiently computed. Here we choose p = 4, and h = 3.
2,3. In these steps, the base field GF(p) and its h -degree extension are found.
These operations are described in 1.3.1 above, with the resulting field
GF(ph) given in Appendix A.
4. Compute at = logg(f +/) for i = 0,a,a2,
a0 = logff(f+0) = 56
a i = logs (t+a) = 58
a2 =logg(t+a2) = 25
a 3 =log9(f+a3)
= 1
5. Scramble the a.'s giving bt = a^{) where ic is a random permutation of
0, 1,2, ,p-\. Let n = (2, 3, 1, 0) yielding:
b0 = a^0) = a2 = 25
bi = a^i) = a3 = 1
bi = tt(2) = i = 58
&3 = G7r(3) = aO = 56
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6- Add noise to the 6,-'s giving c,- =b{+d, where d is a random number
0<d<ph-l. Let of =52 yielding:
c0 = b0 + 52 = 11
cx = bx + 52 = 53
c2 = Z>2 + 52 = 110
c3 = b3 + 52 = 108
7. Public key:
{c= (77, 53, 110, 108); p =4; /z =3}
8. Private key:
{f (t) =t3+a; g =t + 1; n = (0,3,l,2); d = 52}
b. Encryption
Encrypt a message M which is a binary vector of length p containing
exactly h ones as follows:
=P-i
E(M) = E Ci-Mi (mod ph-\)
i=0
Thus if we wish to send the message M = 0 1 1 1 , we find
E(M) = (0-77) + (l-53) + (M10) + (M08) = 271 = 19 (mod 63)
c. Decryption
1. Compute r(t ) = th (mod /(f)) = a.
2. Compute s = E(M)-hd (mod ph-\) = 19-(3)(52) (mod 63) = 52.
3. Find tf(f) =g9(mod
f(t))=g52
=
a2t2+at+a.
4. Find 5(f) =
th
-r(t) + q(t) =
t3 +
a2t2
+ at .
5. By (at most p ) successive substitutions we can factor d (t ):
s(t) = (t+0)it+a)-(t+a3)
This corresponds to the pattern 1101, to which
tT1is applied to recover the
original message M = 0111.
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APPENDIX C
Makefile for the System
#
# Makefile for Chor-Rivest Cryptosystem
#
BELL = "G"
SRCS
GEN
ENC
DEC
FAC
#
#
#
see:
list:
= Makefile types.h globalh mp.h global.c\
poly.c utility.c error.c\
gf.c chinese.c logarithm.c\
generate.c encrypt.c decrypt.c
= global.o poly.o error.o utility.o gf.o mp.o\
chinese.o logarithm.o generate.o
= globalo error.o mp.o encrypto
= globalo poly.o error.o mp.o decrypt.o
= factor.o mp.o
Targets for the make command
cat S(SRCS) | more
generate:
encrypt:
decrypt:
cat 5(SRCS) | pr -h CHOR_RIVEST >_temp
cat
_temp| Ipr
rm
_temp
S(GEN)
cc -O -o generate S(GEN) -lm
@echo S(BELL)
$(ENC)
cc -O -o encrypt #(ENC) -lm
@echo 5(BELL)
$(DEC)
cc -O -o decrypt S(DEC) -lm
@echo 5(BELL)
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factor: S(FAC)
cc -O -o factor S(FAC) -lm
#
# Dependencies of object files on header files
#
chinese.o: types.h mp.h
decrypt.o: types.h globalh mp.h
encrypto: types.h globalh mp.h
factor.o: mp.h
generate.o: types.h global.h mp.h
gf.o: types.h global.h mp.h
global.o: types.h mp.h
logarithnxo: types.h global.h mp.h
mp.o: mp.h
poly.o: types.h globalh mp.h
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APPENDIX D
Users Manual for the Chor-Rivest Cryptosystem
1. Background
This document describes the commands comprising a public key cryptosystem first
proposed by MIT cryptographers Ben Zion Chor and Ronald Rivest [Chor84].
Throughout the remainder of this manual we refer to this cryptosystem as the Chor-
Rivest system. Derived from the knapsack problem, this system differs from earlier
knapsack public key systems in that computations to create the knapsack are done in fin
ite algebraic structures, called Galois fields. An interesting result from Bose and Chowla
supplies a method of constructing higher densities than previously attainable [Bose62].
Not only does an increased information rate arise, but the new system so far is immune
to the low density attacks levied against its predecessors, notably those of
Radziszowski-Kreher and Lagarias-Odlyzko [Radz86, Laga85].
Normally, a given Chor-Rivest community is serviced by an installation which has
fixed the parameters p and h. The programs described herein can mimic most antici
pated installations by permitting the user to specify these as input. In so doing, the cryp
tanalyst user is afforded means to produce data requisite in breaking a particular instal
lation or the cryptosystem itself.
2. Review of the Cryptosystem
It is not the purpose of this document to describe the underlying workings of the
Chor-Rivest system: This information is presented elsewhere, and is not essential in
order to use the system (see the references, 5, for more information). However, if one
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a more
intends to exploit the flexibility provided by the command modifying options,
detailed understanding of the system is required. In this section we give only a superfi
cial sketch of the algorithms, primarily to indicate variable names.
To generate a matched pair of keys for encryption and decryption the user first
selects a prime power p and a positive integer h <p. These parameters ultimately define
the message space associated with the keys: Messages will consist of p bits, exactly h of
which must be 1's and the other p -h will be O's. Thus, the size of the message space is
P
h
The system (more precisely, the key generation program generate) proceeds by
defining a Galois field GF(p) and an h -degree extension GF(ph) of it. This is done by
finding (at random) a polynomial / (x ) such that GF(p) = ^p[x]/(/(x)), and a a mul
tiplicative generator of GF(p). The field extension is defined by randomly selecting /(f)
a degree h polynomial, irreducible over GF(p), and a g a multiplicative generator of
GF(ph). The next phase of the key generation requires discrete logarithm calculations
(to the base g over GF(ph). From a computational standpoint, this is a very difficult
problem. As a result, certain constraints, detailed in figure 1, are imposed on the choice
of p and h . From certain logarithms, a p element knapsack is formed, then further dis
guised by applying a permutation w and adding a noise factor d. The resulting knapsack
if, along with p and h, comprise the public key (also called the encryption key). The
(1) p < 256 must be a prime power.
(2) h < 25 is a positive integer strictly less than p.
(3) The prime factorization of ph-\ may consist of at most 32 distinct primes, the
largest less than 10s.
Figure 1. Constraints on the choice of system parameters p and h.
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private (or decryption) key consists of f (t ), g, w, d and arithmetic tables over GF(p).
3. Use of the Cryptosystem
Three executable modules are provided:
a) generate, produces a public/private key pair;
b) encrypt, encrypts messages utilizing the public key;
c) decrypt, decrypts messages with the private key;
To run these, one enters the command name followed by arguments to specify options or
data for the program. The usual conventions are used to specify syntax in the following
sections:
a) optional arguments are enclosed in brackets [ ],
b) arguments are processed in order (left to right),
c) ellipses ". . indicate an arbitrary number of the argument type.
3.1. Specifying Options
A few options are provided to alter the behavior of the basic commands. Options
are preceded by a minus "-" sign, and may be placed anywhere on the command line.
Note however, that in the case of encrypt or decrypt commands, the options will take
effect only for the arguments following the option. So for instance, the command
command -x filel -y file2
will process filel with only the
"x"
option enabled, while file2 will be handled under the
influence of both "x" and "y". When several options are desired they may be lumped
together as a string with a single minus sign prefix, so
command -x -y arguments . . .
has the same effect as
command -xy arguments . . .
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The available options are c, d, r, v for clock, dump, random and verbose respec
tively. The clock option will time various portions of the generate command or the time
to translate each message in the other commands. The verbose option will reveal impor
tant intermediate results to the stdout. The dump option is similar, but only applies to
results of the logarithm calculations, performed by generate. The random option,
described below, actually disables random generation of variables, and the user is
prompted for several additional inputs.
3.2. The Generate Command
The generate command produces keys needed encrypt and decrypt messages so
generate must be run prior to encrypt and decrypt. The public and private keys that
result are placed into files pub_ppp_hh and pri_ppp_hh respectively, where ppp = p on
three digits and hh = h on two digits. The format of these keys is explained later ( 4).
The syntax of the generate command is
generate [-c] [-v] [-r] [-d] -f file p h
In its most basic form, the parameters p and h must be specified along with a file con
taining the factorization of ph-l. This file consists of
integers separated by whitespace
(i.e. blanks, tabs or newline characters), where the first entry is the
number of factors
and successive entries are a prime and the corresponding
power. For example, if p = 4
and h = 3 then
ph-\ =63 = 32-71.
This information is ordered in an arbitrary file as
"2327 1" or "2713 2". An auxiliary
program factor prompts the user for p and h and
outputs the factorization of ph-\. If
the output is redirected into a file, it can be easily
edited to conform to the above
requirements. Constraints on the choice of p and h are
detailed in figure 1.
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Normally, the system randomly selects possibilities for the special polynomials
/ (x), a, f (t) and g until suitable candidates are found; the noise factor d is also a ran
dom number ( 2). The user can override this random approach by specifying the -r
option (any where on the command line) to the generate program. In this case he is
prompted for these values as they are required. Figure 2 illustrates the features of this
option. There are several points of interest in this session. First, notice that the system
has prompted for the same information in steps (1) and (3), and in steps (2) and (4):
This indicates that the first set of coefficients supplied for / (x ) and a were unaccept
able. In steps (1) and (2) we tried the polynomials f(x) = x2 + x + 1 and a = 1. Clearly
(0) generate 4 3 -f factors__of_63 -r
(1) Enter coefficients of f(x), modulus of GF(p) (degree 2)
term 2: 1
term 1: 1
termO: 1
(2) Enter coefficients of generator of GF(p) (degree 1)
term 1: 0
termO: 1
(3) Enter coefficients of f(x), modulus of GF(p) (degree 2)
term 2: 1
term 1: 1
termO: 1
(3) Enter coefficients of generator of GF(p) (degree 1)
term 1: 1
termO: 1
(4) Enter coefficients of f(t), modulus of GF(pAh) (degree 3)
term 3: 3
term 2: 0
term 1: 0
termO: 1
(5) Enter coefficients of g, generator of GF(pAh) (degree 2)
term 2
term 1
term 0
(6) Enter noise factor d. Enter size and decimal
number 1 40
Figure 2. Execution with -r option (user inputs in bold).
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a constant polynomial will not prove to be a multiplicative generator of the field GF(p),
therein lies the reason for the repeated requests (3) and (4). The reason that we are
prompted for both / (x ) and a is that the system tries these as a pair: Upon failure, the
system has no way of knowing which polynomial was in error. By reiterating the choice
of / (x ) and changing to a = x + 1 the system is satisfied and moves on to the next
prompt.
The next phase is to define an extension of GF(p), namely GF(ph) by finding an
irreducible h -degree polynomial f (t) and a generator g in steps (5) and (6). Here we
are specifying coefficients as powers of the generator a of GF (p ), or 0. So our entries of
(3,0,0,1) for the coefficients of / (f ) really indicate the coefficients (a3, 0,O^1). The same
is true of g, the generator, so we have successfully specified the field GF(43) by the
polynomials
f(t) = a3t3 + a = t3+a,
g =
a3t2+ a =
t2 + a.
Recall that in GF(p), ap_1= 1 for p (a prime power). Also note that both f(x) and
/(f) must be monic (leading coefficient of 1): Because in GF(ph) we are entering
powers of a, the leading coefficient of /(f) must be set to p-1 to yield a monic polyno
mial.
In step (6) the system prompts for d the noise factor to be added to each knapsack
element. This value must be an positive integer, but can be quite large, so it must be
entered piecemeal, in base 10s. In this example the
notation 1 40 means that there is one
108 digit, and this digit is 40 yielding d = 40. If on the
other hand we had wanted to set
d to 111,112,222,222,233,333,333 then the following entry
would be in order:
3 11111 22222222 33333333.
Basically, just break the number into eight
digit pieces, beginning with the ones digit,
and prefix this with the number of pieces.
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3.3. The Encrypt Command
The command encrypt uses the public key to transform an arbitrary number of
plaintext messages, one per file, into ciphertext. The output is written to the stdout, with
a newline character following each ciphertext message. If this output is instead
redirected into a separate file, then it is ready to use as an argument to the program
decrypt.
There is a very rigid format for each plaintext message: Only one message per file
is permitted. Furthermore, the message must consist of exactly h l's and p -h O's, how
ever, whitespace may be inserted as desired to enhance readability.
The syntax is
encrypt [-c] public_key [-c] filel [-c] file2 . . .
where filerc are plaintext files having the format just described. Clocking takes effect for
each file to the right of the -c on the command line. Once started, there is no way to
disable the clock, although it will time each of the message transformations individually.
The output from this option is also to the stdout. If the output is redirected to a file, the
timing information must be removed (using an editor) prior to decryption.
3.4. The Decrypt Command
The command decrypt will decrypt an arbitrary number of messages produced by
encrypt, using the private key.
The syntax is
decrypt [-c] [-v] private_key [-c] [-v] filel [-c] [-v] file2 . . .
where each file contains an arbitrary number of ciphertext messages, one per line. The
same rules apply for the options -v and -c as for the -c option to encrypt. That is, the
options take effect on subsequent files, and cannot be disabled once enabled. Here
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again, the output is to the stdout, one plaintext translation per line.
4. Communication Between Modules
The generate command produces two text files that can be inspected or renamed.
One file is the public key file originally named pub_ppp_hh, which must be the first
(non-option) argument to encrypt. The other is the private key file originally named
pri_ppp_hh, which must be the first (non-option) argument to decrypt.
4.1. The Public Key
The public key is really a knapsack vector <f: There are p elements, for which any
/z-fold sum (modulo ph-\) is unique.
The file containing the public key contains the parameters p h and the knapsack
vector c*. This file has p + 1 lines, p and h occupy the first line separated by a space.
An element c,- of c* is found on each successive line.
The ct are very large numbers, represented internal to the system as arrays of
230
digits, with a header indicating how many of these digits are used to hold the number.
In the public key file, the header and the
230 digits are separated by a space,
c,-[0] c,-[c,-[0]] c,-[c,-[0]-l] c,-[2] c,[l],
where c,[ 1 ] is the least significant digit.
4.2. The Private Key
The private key, composed of f(t),g,ir,d and arithmetic tables over GF(p), is
supplied as the first argument to decrypt. The polynomials /(f) and g are represented
by a series of integers in the range 0 p-1. These denote the power of a of each
coef
ficient or zero for a missing term. In the key file the first line has h + 1 entries one for
each coefficient of the h -degree polynomial / (f ). Similarly, the second line has h entries
for g. The third line of the public key file contains the permutation w such that /
-nr,-
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for 0< i <p-l. The noise factor d occupies the fourth line using the same notation as
the ct of the public key ( 4.1). The p x p addition and multiplication tables occupy the
next 2p lines of the file with p values on each line.
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